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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: A REPORT AND
AN EVALUATION
FRANK E. HORACK, JR.t

When Lord Hewart in 1929 challenged that "to employ the
terms administrative 'law' and administrative 'justice' to such
a system, or negation of system, is really grotesque,"' he keynoted a controversy which courts of law had kept alive since
the ascension of "equity." In bold reply the Report on Ministers' Powers asserted that "It goes without saying that it is
the duty of every Minister or Ministerial Tribunal, to whom the
function of adjudication is assigned, to act judicially and to
come to decisions in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose task it is to mete out justice. But it
does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must
be the same * * * so long as the principles of natural justice are
observed, a certain degree of elasticity may be not only necessary
''
but desirable. 2
A similar history clothes the Final Report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Agitation
for administrative law reform crystallized in the early editions
of the Logan-Walter bill and prompted the Attorney General
when appointing his committee to observe that "Some criticisms
have from time to time been directed at certain features of administrative procedure. It would tend toward a clarity of thinking to ascertain in a thorough and comprehensive manner to
what extent, if any, these criticisms are well founded and to
suggest improvements if any are found advisable."11
This point of reference conditioned at least in part the form
t B.A., University of Iowa, 1926; J.D., 1929; LL.M., Harvard University,
1930; S.J.D., 1931; Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. Hewart, The New Despotism (1929) 44. "The exercise of arbitrary
power is neither law nor justice, administrative or at all. The very conception of 'law' is a conception of something involving the application of
known rules and principles, and a regular course of procedure. There are
no.rules or principles which can be said to be rules or principles of this
astonishing variety of administrative 'law,' nor is there any regular course
of procedure for its application." Ibid.
2. Committee on Ministers' Powers (London, Cmd. 4060, 1932), Report
99.
3. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
Report (1941) 253.
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and flavor of the report. It had the salutary effect of directing
a specific and detailed evaluation of the practices of 27 of the
more important administrative agencies. Under the direction of
Professor Walter Gellhorn a report on the procedure of each
agency was presented to the committee. With the benefit of this
concise and incisive information the certainty of easy generalization should have been dispelled and it might have been hoped
that a united report would result. Instead two reports emanated
and the majority's apparent attempt to temper its position and
gain unity failed.
THE MAJORITY REPORT
No single fact is more striking in a review of existing
Federal administrative agencies than the variety of the
duties which are entrusted to them to perform * * * A procedure which would be for the protection of the individual
in one situation may be clearly to his injury in another.The nine chapters of the majority report constitute perhaps
the best analysis of administrative law and procedure now available. Though not a great political document in the sense of The
Federalist,nor perhaps detailed enough to be classed as a great
scientific tract the report in its own way is great. In comparison
the recommended accompanying bill, now known as S.675 is
disappointing. At least judged by the conclusions of the preceding nine chapters the bill only tempers the wind to the wolf in
sheep's clothing.
The Origins, Development, and Characteristicsof the Administrative Process. In the short twenty-four pages of this first
chapter, the committee discloses, in a more realistic fashion than
ever before available, the origin and growth of administrative
agencies and the reasons and consequences of that growth. The
illusion that we are meeting today a new and greedy monster is,
I hope, forever dispelled by the careful documentation of the
antiquity of many of the agencies themselves and of the methods
which most of them employ. The argument of novelty is always
open to suspicion, but when it is demonstrated, as it has been
by the report, to be untrue, let us hope that the argument may
be afforded a much needed repose.
Even more constructive than the documentation of the tenure
of the administrative process in the United States is the catalog
4. Id. at 20. Contrast with Statement of Minority, id. at 203 et seq.
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of reasons for resort to the administrative process. Certainly of
most compelling weight is the committee's conclusion that the
"insistence of the courts upon confining themselves to judicial,
as distinguished from executive or legislative, functions has made
inevitable the conferring of a wide range of powers * * * upon
some one of the executive departments or upon an independent
agency." 5 Faced with this necessity, congressional delegation to
administrative agencies has tended to preserve the "rule of law"
to a greater degree than would similar delegation to the executive alone. Thus, it appears that Congress, rather than avoiding,
has sought the "rule of law" by the only course practically available to it.
The report likewise emphasizes the volume of administrative
work with its attendant need for hundreds of skilled technicians
and scientists and its thousands of employees skilled in record
keeping, reporting, and administration generally. And these
thousands have been required because a single administrative
agency frequently disposes of many more claims and disputes in
a year than the entire federal judiciary settles in a similar
period. Perhaps the time has come when government must take
over the enforcement of private rights, as in an early time it
had to replace private prosecution with criminal administration.
Whatever the cause, and however well the job is being done, it
seems certain that administrative tribunals are bringing orderly
adjudication to a much larger percentage of our citizenry than
the judicial system has ever been able to achieve. Perhaps the
"rough justice" of administration is better than no justice at all.
And this latter condition, unfortunately, is all too frequent
where court costs, attorney fees, and the burden of delay effectively preclude a majority from the protection of the judicial
system.
Administrative Information. A caifvass of much that has been
written and said about administrative agencies discloses widespread ignorance of even the simple structure, organization, and
procedure of the most common agency. Thus the recommendations of the majority that the agency should exert every effort
to disseminate information concerning its structure and organization is, of course, undebatable. But when it proceeds to recom5. Id. at 13.
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mend and incorporate in its bill that "As soon as the 'policies' of
an agency become sufficiently articulated to serve as real guides
to agency officials in their treatment of concrete problems, that
fact may advantageously be brought to public attention by publication in a precise and regularized form," it has gone too far.
The ability to raise suspicion without the ability to prove or disprove it is characteristic of this provision, although its directory
nature is less subject to censure than the mandatory character
of the minority's similar requirement. 7 Likewise, the committee
suggests that interpretations, staff instructions, and understanding should be made public. The flavor of these recommendations
suggests unnecessary distrust of administrative agencies. Administrators are human, of course, but certainly one human
characteristic is the avoidance of trouble, and it seems altogether
probable that an administrator who can avoid controversy and
escape the burdens of unnecessary enforcement will be eager to
disseminate any information that will lighten his load.
This difficulty results primarily from the casual administrative
practitioner who is unacquainted with the numerous information services maintained by the agencies. Only time and inquiry
will arm him with sufficient information to escape the pitfalls
of his own ignorance.
Declaratory Administrative Rulings. The majority's bill
grants to an agency tribunal the discretionary power to "issue
declaratory rulings concerning rights, status, and other legal
relations * * * in order to terminate a controversy or remove an
uncertainty."s Whatever reservations may be necessary concerning the constitutionality or the workability of this particular
proposal, the committee cannot be too highly praised for proposing it. Although life and law are mostly prediction, habit and
custom have for the bulk of society provided security and made
prediction based on words and actions fairly reliable. Administrative officials are unwilling exceptions to the rule. And courts
have placed them in this unenviable position.
In everyday contacts of life it is easy to forget how necessary
and important this ability to rely on another's word and to treat
the future not as prediction but as fact, really is. Its value is
6. Id. at 27.

7. See id. at 226, Minority Bill sec. 203 (c).
8. Id. at 202, Majority Bill sec. 401.
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best emphasized when it is absent. For example, in State v.
Foster,9 the defendant wished to open a store temporarily to sell
goods to the Christmas trade. He sought the best advice he could
get. The highest court was foreclosed to him, both by the rules
of procedure, and by the more pertinent fact that they could not
give him an opinion under any circumstances until long after the
Christmas trade would be over. He went to the state auditor and
inquired if he needed an itinerant vendors' license. He was informed that he did not. Later he was prosecuted for violating
the statute and was told that although he had acted on the best
advice then available, he must nevertheless pay a fine. This, of
course, is manifestly unfair, but unfortunately similar occurrences are not infrequent in the administration of the law.
For example, if a taxpayer is uncertain concerning his liability
for taxes on a proposed business deal, the only way he can determine his liability is to go ahead with the deal and take the
consequences. This is true not so much because administrators
are unwilling to give opinions in advance as because courts will
not give effect to such interpretations; and thus administrators
think it unfair to give advice to applicants when the applicants
cannot rely on it.
Fortunately for most of us, we may act without fear that
at some subsequent time our acts will be considered unlawful,
but there is an ever increasing need for binding interpretations
of the law precedent to action. This the committee report seeks
to provide. The generality of its provisions, however, seems
inadequate.
In section 402, declaratory rulings are given the effect of a
final order. This application seems too narrow unless the tribunal
itself may in the final order condition the ruling so that it is
binding on subject matter not in issue upon the final order. For
example, it would be advantageous to a prospective taxpayer to
procure a declaratory ruling on the valuation of stock for stock
transfer tax or income tax purposes. It might be disadvantageous if the rule was binding for inheritance or gift tax purposes.
The fact determination in each case is the same, and it, therefore, seems desirable, if the taxpayer is to gain the advantage
of a declaratory ruling, that the Bureau of Internal Revenue
9. (1900) 22 R. I. 163, 46 AtI. 833.
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should also gain the advantage of finality in all cases involving
the fact situation ruled upon. To permit the taxpayer at a later
date to litigate the valuation question in a gift tax proceeding
should not be permitted.
Section 403 makes a declaratory ruling binding upon all
parties "who have or claim any legal interest which would be
affected by the declaration." 10 The effect of this provision is
limited, for no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons
not party to the proceedings. The desirability of this limitation
may be doubted. One of the principal uses of the declaratory
ruling procedure would be to determine the status of an indeterminate class of persons or a class where "legal notice" would
be impractical-as, for example, the interest of bondholders,
resident in numerous judicial districts, under a reorganization
proceeding. In such a case it would be impractical to give all
parties notice unless it could be given in the equity sense. Of
course, section 403 permits the rule to have binding force on
those voluntarily coming into the proceedings to "claim any legal
interest," but it may readily be anticipated that unless the "class
suit" type of notice can bind all parties affected, many persons
will intentionally remain out of the proceedings in order to preserve their rights for later judicial litigation. It seems desirable
to clarify this section to make it certain that upon the initiation
of the department all persons may be bound as parties so that
the procedural defects of district court jurisdiction may be escaped and that a minority of persons can be prevented from
continuing litigation and preventing a final settlement at their
will.
Although closer study will disclose many minor deficiencies in
the proposals for declaratory rulings, the significance of the
proposal for a more speedy and fairer procedure both to the
government and private individuals suggests that this recommendation may become the most significant contribution of the
committee's report.
Administrative Rule Making. Compared with the impractical
provisions of the Logan-Walter bill, the recommendations of the
majority certainly are not open to severe censure. Yet it seems
that the committee was unwilling to take a strong stand against
10. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
Report (1941) 202.
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required notice and hearing in rule making proceedings. It declared that it "believes that the practice of holding public hearings in the formulation of rules * * * should be continued and
established as standard administrative practice, to be extended as
circumstances warrant into new areas of rule making."'1
A priori judgment on this issue is questionable. On some occasions, notice and hearing will provide administrators with detailed information which they could procure in no other way.
Again, it may assist in preserving cooperative relations between
enforcement and industry. Again, it may be injurious to enforcement by warning that existing practices will be prohibited
and thus permit an acceleration of those practices in the period
immediately preceding promulgation. Finally, it may be only useless, consuming the time of both the interested parties and the
agency without producing tangible improvement in the completed
rules. Legislative and administrative hearings have time and
again disclosed these variables. Thus it seems to this reviewer
that the majority, though perhaps impelled by considerations of
policy, was unjustified in encouraging an extension of legislative
notice and hearing practices, to all fields of administration.
The committee also recommends more formal promulgation
of administrative regulations. This seems an immediately desirable recommendation. There will be a few emergency situations where delay in the time of taking effect will be either impossible or impractical but generally the job of the enforcing
officer will be made easier and the enforcement itself will seem
fairer if those who must abide by the regulations have an opportunity to prepare for that event.
The judicial review of legislative rules, like the requirement
of hearing, was a major concern of the Logan-Walter bill. The
committee, however, on this occasion took a strong stand in
opposition to the review requirement, when it asserted that "if
an administrative agency is best qualified to weigh the facts and
opinions that culminate in regulations, its conclusions should be
final and it is no anomaly that they are."'12 Even though some
statutory review provisions now permit judicial inquiry at the
enactment stage, the conclusions of the report should stand as a
warning against their further extension.
11. Id. at 108.
12. Id. at 119.
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Administrative Adjudication. Embroiled in the whirlpool of
controversy over the prosecutor-judge complex, the majority expended great space discussing the problems of formal methods
of administrative adjudication, although it had previously concluded quite accurately that "informal procedures constitute the
vast bulk of administrative adjudication and are truly the lifeblood of the administrative process." 14
Apparently convinced that the separation of powers opponents
would and could demand complete separation of the investigatory
and adjudicating functions, the majority conceded the desirability of separation but offered the alternative of internal agency
division of function. This certainly was not a radical proposal,
for indeed the separation of powers, as has so frequently been
pointed out, is little more than an appropriate division of labor,
and so most agencies have already to a greater or less extent
found separation a serviceable organizational device.
The alleged subordination of all employes to the wish and word
of the administrative head has made the administrator the bogey
man of unfairness. And so even the majority concluded that as
long as the adjudicator was subject to the influence of the administrator, he would not be independent. Thus they proposed
to create "hearing commissioners" who will serve two masters
and thus defy the Biblical admonition.
The committee proposes that "To each agency * * * there
should be added officials to be known as hearing commissioners
to hear cases. These officials should be men of ability and prestige, and should have a tenure and salary which will give assurance of independence of judgment. They should be appointed
for stated terms of seven years, and be removable only upon
formal charges of fraud, neglect of duty, incompetence, or other
impropiety."' ' Appointment is to be made by a newly created
office, the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure. The determination at the hearing is binding upon the department unless
after proper notice and within a reasonable time the case is
called up for review by the head of the agency.
Hearing commissioners are to be nominated by the agency but
"shall be appointed by the Office of Federal Administrative Pro13. Id. at 43-95.

14. Id. at 35.
15. Id. at 46.
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cedure if that office finds him to be qualified by training, experience, and character to discharge the responsibilities of the position."l The hearing commissioner may be removed only upon
charges made after hearing held by the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure. Thus in every way his tenure attaches
to an office independent of the agency for whom he works. But
his salary shall be paid from agency funds. Thus if the "premise
of influence" over trial examiners and hearing commissioners is
correct, the hearing officer will indeed feel many inconsistent
pressures.
Although this is a novel proposal in American administrative
practice, I feel that it is too early to ascribe to it the great significance that present discussions attribute. Although the attempt
to gain independence of hearing officers without complete divorcement from the agency is a compromise, I think it should
not be pre-judged either favorably or adversely. The psychological advantage of independence from the point of view of the
criticizing minority of the public, is, of course, attractive. To
what extent the independence of position will attempt to delay
and harass orderly administrative practices as viewed by the department can hardly be determined in advance.
In only two situations do we have previous experience in
American administrative law. One is with the courts themselves
and the other with the administrative tribunals such as the
Board of Tax Appeals and the Court of Customs Appeals. The
hostility of many courts toward administrative practice, of
course, has long been asserted by administrative officials and
seems in part substantiated by experience. Likewise in the case
of administrative courts, certain apparent frictions have existed
between the Bureau of Customs and the Customs Court and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Board of Tax Appeals. But
these instances are perhaps isolated and the committee may be
justified in suggesting this new proposal. Certainly, however, its
long and rather involved argument in favor of the semi-independent hearing officer smacks more of expediency than of conviction. Pages of conjecture might be written concerning the
possible evils and benefits but little can be known without a trial
of the proposal.
16. Id. at 196, Majority Bill sec. 302 (3).
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Judicial Review. The majority is not particularly troubled by
the hue and cry of "insufficient judicial review." While the
committee does devote considerable space to the consideration
of the multiplicity of channels through which administrative
action may flow to the courts, and while it recognizes that considerable diversity exists between statutory provision for review,
it nevertheless concludes quite appropriately that "When and if
the Congress is dissatisfied with the existing review of particular types of administrative determinations, it then may and
should, by specific and purposive legislation, provide for such
change as it desires. Only by addressing itself to particular
situations, and not by general legislation for all agencies and
all types of determinations alike, can Congress make effective and
desirable change." 17
This statement should be sufficient for the purposes of this
review, and indeed it provides the most authoritative and well
documented determination that has yet been written on this
subject. Further elaboration would certainly be presumptuous.
THE MINORITY REPORT
Federal administrative agencies * * * are now an enter-

prise of gigantic proportions, far overshadowing in power,
personnel, and prestige the largest industrial establishments.1
Although identified in the Report as the "Additional Views
and Recommendations of Messrs. McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt," it is certainly more accurate to view with scepticism
their declaration that they have "accepted the major outlines of
the report * * * and * * * have departed as little as possible

from the solutions suggested by the full Committee," 9 and consider their report as a dissent to the proposals of the committee.
The method of presenting the minority report is indicative of
the difference between the two groups. While the majority found
it necessary to present their report from the background and
experience of the several agencies as they operated in fact, the
minority discovered that "the separation of functions," "judicial
review" and "legislative standards" were sufficient starting (and
stopping) points. This is a bit surprising in light of the general
17. Id. at 92.
18. Id. at 213.
19. Id. at 203.
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familiarity of these men with and experience in the administrative process. If this was possible for them, how delusively attractive must the old generalizations be, for those less familiar
with, and more dogmatic concerning the administrative process.
The Separation of Functions. The minority finds the separation of functions necessary because "history and tradition have
given English-speaking peoples a governmental pattern which
they regard as the essence of fair adjudication." 20 They find that
this tradition requires that the legislators must only legislate,
the prosecutor only prosecute, and the judge only judge. Delusively simple. But certainly the prosecutor is judging when he
refuses to prosecute, and the judge is legislating when he "interprets" the law. And why not? These are results only, and the
question is, are the results good or bad? This the minority only
assumes when it asserts that the plan of the majority "cannot
fully achieve the complete independence that is essential for the
exercise of the adjudicatory function."' 21
The minority thus concludes:
Hearing and deciding officers cannot be wholly independent
so long as their appointments, assignments, personnel records, and reputations are subject to control by an authority
which is also engaged in investigating and prosecuting *1**
such dependents (sic) cannot be eliminated by measures
short of complete segregation into independent agencies.22
But the bill proposed by the minority does not go so far and
only reiterates the proposal of the majority, that "where agencies
or their members or representatives make formal adjudications,
there shall be a complete segregation of prosecuting from hearing and deciding functions,'

23

unless the greater authority of the

Office of Federal Administrative Procedure over the selection
and tenure of hearing commissioners may be construed to be the
minority's effort for the cause of separation.24
Obviously, our criticism of the majority's pre-judging of what
is a necessary separation of function applies even more forcefully to the minority's position. Further and more direct attack
should be made against the minority's suggestion that "at this
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Ibid.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237-9.
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stage of procedure deciding officers should, except for proper use
of official notice and clerical help, confine their consideration
strictly to matters of record produced during formal proceedings."
It is very difficult to visualize the minority's conception of a
hearing officer: at one moment he is a monster bent on vilifying
a defenseless citizen without regard to form or fair play; again
he is a Casper Milquetoast and will be led astray even by administrative subordinates, who no doubt with Machiavellian cunning
will seduce his judgment and determination: for certain, though,
he must be ignorant, for by the very terms of the minority's
proposed statute both he and his assistants must decide the case
upon only so much information as the parties to the proceedings
see fit to divulge.
JudicialReview. With a showing of temperance, the minority
suggest that judicial review "should not be too broad and searching or it will hamper administrative efficiency. It should not be
so restricted or so devitalized as to fail as a check upon palpable
administrative error or abuse of power. ' 26 But upon a consideration of the deficiencies in the present system of judicial review,
the minority finds that since the Supreme Court in Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. 2 7 indicates that
it will not review fact-issues involving due process, equal protection, and other constitutional guarantees, new legislation must
reverse the trend of the past two decades. Apparently the minority overlooked the fact that the liberties of property were not
thought to be jeopardized during the century that preceded the
Ben Avon decision.
Likewise the minority is restive under the substantialevidence
rule and suggests that the court "should set aside decisions
28
If
clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence."
25. Id. at 209. "In the consideration and decision of any case, hearing or
deciding officers shall personally master such portions of the record as are
cited by the parties. They may utilize the aid of law clerks or assistants
(who shall perform no other duties or functions) but such officers and such
clerks or assistants shall not discuss particular cases or receive advice,
data, or recommendations thereon with or from other officers or employees
of the agency or third persons, except upon written notice and with the
consent of all parties to the case or upon open rehearing." Id. at 242,

Minority Bill sec. 309 (m) (4).
26. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
Report (1941) 211.
27. (1940) 310 U. S. 573.
28. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
Report (1941) 211.
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enough dispute has not already been occasioned by the ambiguity
of the substantial evidence rule, certainly the new phrase will
suffice to change judicial review into judicial supremacy over the
facts as well as the law. But this basic assumption that the court
will act correctly-and the administrative agency will act incorrectly certainly has not been reflected in general public attitudes
or in specific legislative restrictions, and it may be presumed that
this postulate is more in the minds of the minority members
than "in the hearts of their countrymen."
Apparently, upon reflection, the minority added that some fact
determinations "are rendered by long-established, well-tried
tribunals in whom all persons have confidence; some come from
new and hurriedly organized agencies," 29 and that the courts
should have discretion as to the agencies in which they should
place reliance. This seems to suggest review by suspicion which
can hardly be consonant with constitutional verities implicit in
judicial supremacy.
The minority then suggests that Congress devise legislation
which would classify the "several types of issues decided by each
administrative agency"30 and "provide special degrees of review
as to each."' "The graver the possible effects of the error"3 2
and the court's judgment whether the tribunal was "trained by
experience to decide the questions at issue,"'33 would determine
the degree of review.
The minority's position is untenable. The suggestion that the
court need review "fact questions arising under employees' compensation legislation"'34 with less scrutiny than questions involving "important issues arising under a regulatory statute, involving the limits of interstate commerce" 35 admits that review is
unnecessary to protect the interests of the "little man." "Largess
for largeness" should hardly be the motto in a democracy.
Likewise, the reliance upon courts to determine the sufficiency
of agency experience places the test of competence in a body
which from the very generality of its function must forever be
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Id. at 212.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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removed from the detail of information necessary to determine
competence in fields of specialization.
Legislative Standards of Fair Procedure. The minority emphasizes that administration has grown "without the benefit of
an over-all guiding hand to appraise and improve." 36 This is
perhaps a blessing. The common law has frequently been criticized for its failure to diversify and to make its rules reflect the
needs of differing situations. Administrative procedures hewn
from the experience of a particular agency may more accurately
reflect the best procedure for that agency than does a procedure
which fits into some over-all symmetry. Not until we know that
two or more agencies have similar problems, similar quantities
and quality of work, and similar types of determinations will we
be in a position to say with assurance that the need for uniformity in procedure is compelling. This the minority recognizes,
for it indicates that the remedy "is to identify the few basic
considerations and express them in legislative statements of
policy, of principles, or of standards for the guidance of administrators, subject always to reasonable variation to meet
varying needs." 337 Certainly no one can seriously dissent from
this policy, even though many of the specific recommendations
are already such common administrative practice that it seems
perhaps a little presumptuous to direct administrators to act in
a manner that they have always followed and thereby imply,
perhaps, that such has not been their course.
Some of the statements of policy, however, are more than
guides for administrators-they are commands, and to this reviewer they appear to be unwise commands. It is true that by
direction of the President they may be modified, but I fear the
day is not long enough, nor his staff of assistants large enough
to do the job.
First, section 202 attempts to substitute administrative legislation for administrative adjudication as far as possible. Certainly as a general objective this is desirable and it is obvious
that every good administrator will seek to avoid controversy by
issuing rules and regulations in advance of conflict wherever
possible. But it seems both optimistic and unwise to direct
administrators to publish as rules all "general policies not clearly
236. Id. at 213.
,7. Id. at 214.
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specified in legislation" 3 and to prohibit agency action on any
unpublished statement of policy. Although this provision seems
entirely impractical of enforcement, its very existence permits
the harassment of the agency-for who can demonstrate that
there was not a "secret policy." Its very allegation will go far to
destroy public confidence, and the agency denial will have little
counteracting effect once the seeds of suspicion are planted.
Courts of law have always held that the motives of legislators
are not available iij the interpretation of statutes. And even the
severest critics of the courts have not suggested that they have
followed secret policies in their determinations. To single out the
administrative agency is to contrast and attack its integrity.
Can the charge be sustained?
Although detailed directions concerning the adoption of rules
are set forth in sections 205-210, the provisions escape the objection of similar directions in the Logan-Walter bill, inasmuch
as they are directory only.30 Certainly, so long as rule-making is
a legislative function, the same flexibility of procedure which
attends legislative determination should be preserved.
The minority's conceptions of "Fair Standards of Procedure"
reflect primarily their attitudes on judicial review. These conceptions need not be discussed except so far as they make mandatory the issuance of declaratory rulings upon the petition of
any interested party.40 It seems quite obvious that no agency
could long survive a concerted request for declaratory rulings
unless they had the power to select the propositions on which
they were prepared to rule. Useful as declaratory rulings are,
they can be of value only where there has been a full disclosure
by the petitioner, where the petitioner will be bound not only
on the particular case, but on all cases relating to the same set of
facts, and where the agency is prepared to commit itself to a
particular policy. Although the ruling in a particular case is not
binding upon persons who are not parties, administrators must
live in a society where discriminatory treatment is not acceptable,
38. Id. at 225, Minority Bill sec. 202 (b).
39. But directory words have been interpreted as mandatory when they
relate to public officials. People ex rel. Reynolds v. Buffalo (1893) 140 N.
Y. 300, 35 N. E. 485; Pierson v. People ex rel. Walter (1903) 204 Ill. 456,
68 N. E. 383.
40. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
Report (1941) 234, Minority Bill sec. 304.
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and where laymen neither accept nor understand the dry legal
defenses of *res judicata, and parties in interest. Indeed, the
average administrator must comply with a higher sense of fairness than the minority's legal wisdom has imagined.
The minority's position is essentially hostile to administration.
It reflects the reluctance of some practitioners to accept the
technique of administrative adjudication. The common law lawyer must have his, the common law, way or else! But the common law, successful as it has been, is still only one method of
settling disputes. The need for expeditious and simple settlement of controversies greatly exceeding in bulk the amount of
common law litigation cannot be handled by common law procedures. Neither can the procedures which must be substituted
be tested by the doctrines of the common law. There must be fair
play, and honesty and justice, but it must be discovered in different devices and procedures, produced by the intelligent and willing and indeed, humble cooperation of those that operate the
system. It cannot be legislated by those who are fundamentally
opposed to the system and who consciously or unconsciously
suspect the system and all those who are sworn to operate it.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE

GRONER

Convinced that neither the majority nor minority went far
enough to insure the separation of functions, Chief Justice
Groner would like to create wholly independent adjudicatory
tribunals, but realizing that there was practically no sentiment
for that position, suggested in compromise that the hearing commissioner "be appointed by the proposed Office of Administrative
Procedure wholly on its own responsibility, receive his salary
from it and not from the agency's funds, be answerable to it
alone, and be assigned by the Office to the hearing of cases as
the needs of the agencies require."' 41 He concludes that "Only by
this, or some like method, can it be hoped to obtain that which
is the fundamental right of the citizen to have-an open, fair,
and unbiased determination of his rights when charged by the
Government with violation of a regulatory statute.1142
While all can probably agree with him that the founding
fathers did decree that "there should be no oppression, no ex41. Id. at 250.
42. Ibid.
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action by tyranny, no spoilation of private right by public
authority, and that there should be a fair, honest, effective Government to maintain the things which were thought to be the
prerogatives of every individual man,'1 4 3 few would agree that
the administrative system qua system has jeopardized these objectives. For whether we like what the agencies have or have
not done, it remains that the people of America have not been
convinced that the experiment with law enforcement through
administration has been so unsatisfactory that it should be
abandoned or seriously restricted. On the other hand, they have
continuously enacted legislation limiting judicial review, denying courts the right to issue injunctions in particular cases, and
substituting administrative determination for judicial decision
as far as possible. If the American people have, in the past sixtyfive years, expressed themselves, it is to the effect that they
wish fair settlement of disputes and that they expect government
to provide that settlement. But in choosing the manner of settlement, it seems clear that between the judiciary and administration they have placed their confidence at least equally in administrative justice.
CONCLUSION

Although it seems certain that there will be much contemporary controversy over the proposals of the majority and the
minority, and indeed, additional independent proposals," the
significance of the report itself is not contemporary. It presents
a view of past administrative experience and indicates both a
method of action and a method of study for the controversies of
the future. And as neither this nor future administrations can
afford to assume the responsibility for the enforcement of the
laws without the ability to discharge that responsibility, "It is
doubtful if anything like the Logan-Walter bill has a chance of
becoming a law."' 5
Likewise, as lawyers become better acquainted with the opera43. Ibid.
44. See Senate Bill 918 whose sponsors assert that it has taken the
"good points" from both S. 674 and S. 675, but it seems upon examination
to take nothing from S.675 and only add some of the more stringent provisions of the Logan-Walter bill to the already great scriptures of S. 675
itself.
45. Everett Sanders, Secretary to the former President Coolidge, now of
the District of Columbia Bar, in an address to the Indiana University Law
School Alumni banquet, April 19, 1941.
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tion of administrative tribunals, learn of them not from newspaper editorials and political orations but from actual trial experience, the hue and cry will subside. Improvements in administration will be made not by frontal attack but by the more
orderly husbandry of constant attention. The Final Report of
the Attorney General's Committee will then receive recognition
as the turning point in professional attitude toward the administrative process. Certainly it will assume a position of such
significance that no scholar of law or government can afford to
be ignorant of its content.

